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NOTES
The foremost difficulty in the present status of foreign corporation
jurisdiction and qualification is that the laws in too many instances lag
behind the constitutionally permitted opportunities that have been made
available to accommodate modern needs. States, whether by statute or
decision, or both, should take advantage of the greater jurisdiction made
available by the recent constitutional developments. Concomitantly with
this increase in jurisdiction, the qualification policy and especially the
techniques of enforcement are in need of review. Perhaps qualification
should remain "behind" jurisdictional standards as is the usual case to-
day. Or perhaps a state will decide that the activity standard for quali-
fication should approximate that for jurisdiction, especially if the no-"
suit sanction is eliminated and the fines for noncompliance are reduced.
In either event the enforcement of qualification should be left entirely
in the hands of the state. The non-jurisdictional benefits and the ad-
vantages of "automatic" jurisdiction from qualification can be acquired
through the utilization of positive sanctions, now sufficiently efficacious
since the infirmities of judicial jurisdiction have been significantly re-
duced. Reasonable pecuniary penalties could satisfactorily compensate
the state for this burden of enforcement. If the no-suit sanctions are to
be retained in any form, then the "subsequent compliance" type would
seem clearly preferable.
THE EFFECT OF FORCED SHARE STATUTES ON INTER VIVOSCONVEYANCES OF PERSONALTY
The law has long favored the policy that some type of provision
should be made for the support of a widow. This has commonly been
accomplished by setting aside, for the benefit of the widow, a fixed por-
tion of the deceased husband's estate. The evolution of this policy is
both long and varied, with its most familiar manifestation being found
in common law dower.' Dower, however, is no longer the most common
means of its accomplishment. In a majority of states, a contemporary
statutory scheme which utilizes a modified form of dower or a "forced
heir" arrangement has replaced the common law estates of dower.! As
a consequence of this legislative trend, the widow, in many instances, has
been classified as an heir-an heir which the husband cannot exclude in
1. See Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1936).
2. 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, §§ 188, 189 (1935); Cahn, Restraints on'
Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139 at 141 (1936). •
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his will. The Model Probate Code explains this transition by pointing
out that not only did dower tend to restrain the free alienation of prop-
erty, but that it also has become relatively ineffective in accomplishing
the desired results.'
Conceding that a husband cannot make a testamentary disposition
which excludes his wife, the question remains whether he can, neverthe-
less, exclude his wife by other means-namely those which are available
in the form of inter vivos conveyances. This determination depends on
whether the surviving wife has a basis for challenging the validity of her
husband's inter vivos conveyances. The situations in which this problem
has arisen have, in almost every instance, been those which involved a
gratuitous inter vivos conveyance, either directly or in trust, made by the
husband, to a child or other expectant heir. Therefore, in the following
discussion, only this type of transfer shall be considered.
A reasonable estimate of the finality which the law attaches to such
conveyances cannot be made until the policies embodied in the pertinent
sections of the 1953 Probate Code are thoroughly evaluated. Sections
202 and 203 confer what has been termed the "widow's inchoate inter-
est";4 an interest which, in substance, is a statutory form of dower.
With the exception that the statutory expectancy may subsequently be-
come an interest in fee simple (common law dower conferring only an
estate for life), the interests conferred by common law dower and Indi-
ana's statutory form of dower are virtually identical. It is reasonable to
deduce that the motivating policy which underlies the present statutory
interest should be the same policy which prompted the original develop-
ment of common law dower-the salutary policy of providing the widow
3. The comments to section 31 of the Model Probate Code point this out as the
reasons for recommending the abolishment of the estates of dower and curtesy. Indi-
ana has had such a provision since 1852 R.S. 1852 c. 27, § 16, p. 248, IND. ANN. STAT. §
6-211 (Burns 1953).
4. "Inchoate interest of widow.-(a) Any interest acquired by the widow in the
decedent's real estate, including contracts for the purchase of real estate, whether by
descent or devise, not exceeding one-third [1/3] of said decedent's real estate, shall be
received by her free from all demands of creditors: . . ." IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-202
(Burns 1953).
"Inchoate interest of widow-How barred.-No act or conveyance, performed or
executed by the husband without the assent of his wife, evidenced by her acknowledg-
ment thereof in the manner required by law; nor any sale, disposition, transfer or en-
cumbrance of the husband's property, by virtue of any decree, execution or mortgage to
which she shall not be a party (except as provided otherwise by law), shall prejudice or
extinguish the right of the wife to her third [1/3] of any real estate owned by him
during the marriage except to the extent that she may have, pursuant to sections 213 or
306 of this code, entered into a binding written contract, agreement, or waiver thereof,
or preclude her from the recovery thereof, if otherwise entitled thereto." IND. ANN.
STAT. § 6-203 (Burns 1953).
NOTES
a means of support.5 The legislature was prompted to change the form
of the wife's interest because common law dower tended to obstruct the
free alienability of property.' It therefore seems apt to characterize the
present form of statutory dower as a compromise between two conflict-
ing, but socially desirable, principles: namely, the alienability of prop-
erty and the providing of support for the widow.
Section 301 gives to the surviving spouse a power of election, a
power whereby she may renounce the will of her deceased spouse taking
in lieu thereof one-third of the realty and personalty included~in the net
estate.' The surviving spouse, therefore, becomes a forced heir which a
testator cannot totally disinherit. To this limited extent, section 301 is
coercive upon the free will of a testator; no longer may he retain the
control and enjoyment of his property until his death with the anticipa-
tion of excluding his spouse from participating in its disposition at that
time.
There is no disputing the effect of section 301 where such a dispo-
sition is attempted by will; clearly such a will is voidable if the surviving
spouse exercises the election prerogative.' This in itself, however, does
not reflect a complete recognition of the policy ramifications which are
inherent in this section. For instance, certainly no one would contend
that the prohibition of this section is based solely upon a legislative dis-
taste for the use of a will as a dispositive instrument. The purpose of
this prohibition is more than the prohibition of a device; it is the prohibi-
tion of a result which, prior to the section's enactment, could be obtained
by the use of that device. The proscribed result is the attempted disin-
heritance of the surviving spouse where a decedent has retained for his
own use and enjoyment the control and dominion of his property until
the time of his death.9 Thus, the policy of this section may be sum-
5. In Staser v. Garr Scott & Co., 168 Ind. 131, 79 N.E. 404 (1906), the Indiana
Supreme Court indicates that the interest conferred under §§ 202 and 203 is an exten-
sion of common law dower, and as such is interpreted in light of dower. See also ScaRI-
NER, DOWER C. 1 and HENRY, PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE C. 30, § 2 (6th ed. 1954).
6. "Dower and Curtesy abolished.-The estates of dower and curtesy are hereby
abolished." IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-211 (Burns 1953).
7. "Election to take against will of deceased spouse.-When a married person
dies testate as to any part of his estate, the surviving spouse shall have a right of elec-
tion to take against the will under the limitations and conditions hereinafter stated.
(a) The surviving spouse, upon election to take against the will, shall be entitled to
one-third [1/3] of the net personal and real estate of the testator: . . ." IND. ANN.
STAT. § 6-301 (Burns 1953).
8. IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-301 (Burns 1953).
9. In a testamentary disposition, the testator has retained the ownership of his
property until his death. At his death, if he seeks to distribute this property to the
exclusion of his surviving spouse, § 301 allows the surviving spouse to renounce the
will and claim under the law. This mandate is to prevail regardless of the testator's
manifested intent or desire. Thus, this is a legislative determination that a spouse shall
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marized: If a man chooses to own property, he must accept his owner-
ship subject to the incidents legally imposed by the state. One such in-
cident is that if one retains his property until his death, he must share
a portion of it with his surviving spouse. Justification of this policy is
twofold: not only does it secure a minimal means of sustenance to the
surviving spouse, but it also tends to relieve the state of providing sup-
port in situations where the surviving spouse is unable, because of ad-
vanced age or infirmities, to provide her own support.1"
The particular mischief which section 301 seeks to proscribe is that
of property dispositions, including both realty and personalty, which at-
tempt to exclude the surviving spouse while reserving to the grantor an
effective means of use, control, and dominion until the time of his
death. The means of accomplishing this result are only a subordinate
consideration; therefore, an inter vivos transfer which accomplishes this
result may likewise be within the prohibition of this section. The inter-
pretation of section 301 should be calculated to prevent circumvention of
its obvious policy. Therefore, regardless of the means employed, if the
result is identical to that prohibited by the use of a will in section 301,
then those means should also be prohibited by section 301.11 The com-
ments to section 31 of the Model Probate Code (that estates of dower are
frequently ineffective in carrying out the purpose for which they were
created) show that the suggested interpretation of section 301 is not a
not be disinherited. Therefore, it logically follows that the prohibition is of a result-
not a mere means for accomplishing that result.
10. These are reasons which have been offered in justification of dower; they
seem equally appropriate for justification of the interpretation of § 301 suggested above.
See SCRIBNER, DOWER C. 1; HENRY, PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE c. 30, § 2 (6th ed. 1954),
for a discussion of these reasons as related to dower.
11. By this it is not urged that the section should be interpreted to give the wife a
dower type interest in the personalty of her husband. This would seem undesirable;
rather, it is urged that the interpretation of § 301 which is adopted should be one calcu-
lated to prevent circumvention of the obvious policy of that section. Such an interpre-
tation would not be a strained one, inasmuch as it is the result which the legislature
seeks to prohibit and not the mere device employed to accomplish that result. In sup-
port of this line of reasoning is the familiar maxim of equity-one may not do in-
directly that which he cannot do directly. The Indiana Supreme Court expressed this
very thought when it said: "It is a well-settled rule that a matter which is within the
intent or spirit of a statute is as much within the law and the same in effect as if it
were within its express letter." Board of Commissioners of the County of Clinton v.
Given, 169 Ind. 468, 477, 80 N.E. 965 (1907). This was the precise line of reasoning
invoked by the court in Sharp v. State of Indiana ex rel. Board of Commissioners of
the County of Kosciusko, 54 Ind. App. 182, 194 (1913), where it was held that the de-
fendant could not do indirectly that which he could not do directly. What he could not
do himself he could not do by the means of an agency. Continuing, the court quoted
from MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, (2d ed.), p. 133, "It is the duty of the
judge to make a construction as shall suppress all evasions for the continuance of the
mischief. To carry out effectually the object of a statute, it must be so construed as
to defeat all attempts to do or avoid in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it
has prohibited or enjoined."
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misapplication of this support concept. The Indiana Probate Code, by
continuing a statutory form of dower, demonstrates a clear intent to
continue a means of providing support for the widow. The fact that
such means are rendered less effective by the social and economic change
in the type of property owned, strongly urges that section 301 be liberally
interpreted to cope with this change.12 Few Indiana cases have dealt
with this proposition.
In Pond v. Sweetser, the court said, "[T] here is nothing in the law
of this state which in any manner restricts his [the husband's] power of
disposition during his life. In what he dies possessed of she [the wife]
has an interest, but during life he may dispose of it by gift or otherwise,
to the exclusion of any claim on her behalf."' There seems to be no dis-
sent from this general proposition except in those few instances where
the wife attains the status of a creditor.' The law merely requires that
in disposing of one's property he do so in a manner which is not offen-
sive or inconsistent with public policy; e.g., he may not unduly suspend
the power of alienation, create spendthrift trusts in his own behalf, or
provide for an excessive period of accumulation. However, if one makes
a complete and absolute inter vivos transfer of personal property con-
sistent with public policy, the transfer is valid and impervious to any at-
tack regardless of the motives which may have prompted the grantor.
12. In this respect it should be remembered that the policy dower seeks to fulfill
is that of providing support for the widow. The fact that realty was the only type of
property which was subjected to this burden is explainable in part, if not in toto, by the
fact that little if any personalty existed when the doctrine of dower was created. The
wealth of society was in land; as a matter of everyday experience, we know that this is
no longer true. Therefore, if the policy is to continue, it is only logical that the means
employed to fulfill this policy must be suitable to cope with this change. There is
nothing sacred about personalty which should render it immune to this policy, it can be
charged with the responsibility of providing support for a widow as easily as realty.
Because a statutory form of dower is retained, it may be inferred that this shows a
legislative intent that such provision should be considered the sole means for fulfilling
the policy of dower. While such an implication can be drawn- from the fact that §§
202 and 203 are retained in our present Code, it is equally maintainable that the three
sections (202, 203 and 301) were intended to create a scheme which would confer the
maximum of desirable results in light of our contemporary needs.
13. 85 Ind. 144 (1882).
14. When a husband and wife are divorced, the wife attains the status of a creditor
in respect to any alimony payments which the court has awarded her. Bishop v. Red-
mond, 83 Ind. 157 (1882). The wife is also a creditor where she is claiming under the
statutory dower provisions; she is said to take such interests as a purchaser with the
marriage serving as the consideration, May v. Fletcher, 40 Ind. 575 (1872) ; Derry v.
Derry, 74 Ind. 560 (1881); Staser v. Gaar, Scott & Co., 168 Ind. 131, 79 N.E. 404
(1906).
15. This is basic law, law which cannot be changed without modifying or aban-
doning the concept of free alienation of property. In a commercial society this would
be disastrous; the freedom and security of the commercial transaction is vital and fun-
damental. Nevertheless, in applying this concept of free alienation, its importance and
desirability must not be allowed to distort the basic issues to the point, that the concept
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Public policy may limit this power of alienability. Where creditors are
permitted to upset the gratuitous conveyances of their debtors, the con-
cept of free alienation gives way in order that other values may be pre-
served. Similarly, it is urged that gratuitous conveyances which diminish
the net estate out of which the widow's interest will be taken should not
be treated as valid per se, but should be subjected to a close scrutiny in
order to insure that they are in fact absolute, both in subtsance as well as
in form. This is the mandate inherent in the policy of section 301.
A similar approach was taken by the court in interpreting section
3025,16 which was the predecessor of section 301. In a precedent mak-
ing opinion,' the court held invalid an inter vivos trust insofar as it
affected the interests of the surviving wife. The decedent, a very
wealthy man of advanced age and in poor health desired to create a charit-
able trust for the poor people of Crawfordsville, Indiana. After having
made provisions for this trust in his will, the testator was advised that
his wife, should she survive him, could frustrate his plans by exercising
her power of election. In order to avoid this result the testator made
inter vivos assignments of the numerous securities which were to form
the trust corpus. All this was done a short time before the testator's
death. The court in a rather long and not too clear opinion held that
the transfer was not an inter vivos gift inasmuch as the proof was in-
sufficient to show the donor intended an irrevocable gift. The court
then discussed the transfer as a causa mortis gift. After reviewing the
requirements of such a gift, the court concluded that a causa mortis gift
does not vest absolute title in the donee at the time of delivery; instead,
the donor remains "seized or possessed within the meaning of a statute
giving dower in the personal property of which he [the husband] dies
seized."'" This conclusion is in accord with the views expressed by the
Indiana Supreme Court in Devol v. Dye. 9 In drawing what is called the
chief distinction between causa mortis and inter vivos gifts, the court
said a gift inter vivos vests irrovocable title to the property at the time
is indiscriminately applied beyond its legitimate bounds-normally that of the commer-
cial transaction. Much care should be used in applying this principle to transactions
which it was not created to further, when in doing so other worthwhile values are
jeopardized.
16. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3025 (Burns 1908).
17. Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey, 55 Ind. App. 40, 100 N.E. 1049 (1913).
18. It is unfortunate that the court used the term "dower" in describing the inter-
est which inured to the wife under the election statute. Dower in personalty is not
a precise definition of the widow's interest. Dower is an interest which the husband
cannot unilaterally destroy; the interests conferred by § 301 (3025 at the time of the
Crawfordsville case) are not indestructable but are contingent and expectant. Newman
v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
19. 123 Ind. 321, 24 N.E. 246 (1889).
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of delivery, whereas in causa mortis gifts the donee's title is "ambulatory
and inchoate until the death of the donor." This would seem to mean
that title does not pass until the time of the donor's death even though
the donee receives actual or constructive possession of the property.
Even in those jurisdictions which adopt the analysis that the delivery of
a causa mortis gift effects a passage of title, the courts have held that the
gift will not defeat the interests conferred by dower and election stat-
utes."  Certainly, if under an analysis which holds that title has passed
the wife can reach the property, then under a theory which holds that the
title is still in the donor, the wife should be permitted to reach it. There-
fore, regardless of how the technical question of when title passes may
be resolved, the testamentary nature of a causa mortis gift should in it-
self be sufficient reason for bringing it within the prohibition of section
301.21 Consequently, even though a causa mortis gift is perfected in
every regard, the surviving wife can still render it ineffective, as to her,
by exercising her right of election under section 301.
Had the court in the Crawfordsville case stopped with its causa
mortis gift analysis, the precise foundation upon which the judgment
rested would be clear. Instead, the court continued in an effort to sup-
port its interpretation of section 3025 (now 301) by concluding that
regardless of the general rule as to the husband's power to make inter
vivos dispositions of his personal property, "we think it equally well
settled that there are some well defined exceptions to this rule." The
court then quoted from court opinions of other jurisdictions. In these
opinions, the courts had rested their decisions upon theories of fraud or
illusory transfers, not upon a causa mortis gift analysis. In the first
case cited, an inter vivos gift of securities was invalidated because the
grantor had not parted with physical control. The donor had assigned
the securities to his sons but did not surrender the actual possession. In
return for this assignment, the father extracted their powers of attorney
to assure himself complete control of the securities. Prior to his death,
the father collected the dividends and interest, forwarded only those
sums required by the needs of his sons, and expended the residue on his
20. For a very thorough discussion of the history and merits of the two opposing
views, see Hatcher v. Burford, 60 Ark. 169, 29 S.W. 641 (1895).
21. The implied condition of revocation which is inherent in a gift causa mortis
makes the disposition so nearly ambulatory, like that'of a will, that the policy of the
law should not differ in the two cases. SCHOULER, WILLS § 63; 3 REMF., WILLS 324,
note; cf. In re Estate of Collinson v. McNutt, 231 Ind. 605, 106 N.E.2d 225 (1952),
separate opinion of Bobbitt, J., where it is said, "There is no statutory law in Indiana
regulating gifts causa mortis and it, therefore comes to us as part of the common
law. . . . In considering any rule concerning the evidence required to establish a gift
causa mortis, we should examine the public policy of our state on testamentary grants,
as evidenced by our statutes, in order to secure a safe foundation on which to proceed."
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own personal needs.22 The court labeled the transfer a "mere device or
contrivance" which could not succeed in defeating the wife's claim. In an-
other case referred to by the court in the Crawfordsville case, a father con-
veyed to his children by a prior marriage the title to some slaves.23 The
surviving spouse renounced the decedent's will and alleged that he made
the gift while in his last sickness, as a result of undue influence by his
relatives, and for the sole purpose of defeating her marital rights. The
court invalidated this transfer on the grounds that where the husband
has enjoyed property to the fullest throughout his life, the law will not
allow him to make a conveyance of that property at the approach of
death for the purpose of defeating the interests which would have inured
to the wife at the time of his death.24
In the first cited case, the test applied was the substance of the
transaction; i.e., was it a colorable or illusory transfer, a mere device to
mask reality? In the second case, the test applied was the time of the
transfer and the donor's motivating purpose. An interpretation of sec-
tion 301 which would adopt this latter test-the time and intent (motive)
test-would be an unwarranted expansion of the section's language, for
the section envisions only a situation where the testator has retained con-
trol and dominion of his property until the moment of his death. The
time and intent test, however, would strike down a transfer regardless
of the fact that the donor had parted absolutely with all control in sub-
stance as well as form. The net effect would be a direct restriction of
the power to make inter vivos transfers. This result, however, would
22. In this case, the court first attempted to establish a common law basis for al-
lowing the wife to recover by referring to the customs of London: "Such, also, were
the decisions under the ancient custom of London, from which our statute of distribu-
tions is said to have been borrowed. Thus in Hall v. Hall, 2 Vern. 277, it was held that
if a freeman gives away goods in his lifetime, and yet retains the deed of gift in his
own power, or retains the possession of the goods or any part of them, it is a fraud
upon the custom, and will not conclude the widow. . . . The widow's claim for her
share under the statute (statute of distributions) being strictly analogous to the claim
of a widow of a freeman under the custom of London, if a contrivance to evade the
rights of the widow under the custom was never tolerated, there is no reason why it
should meet with more favor under the statute." The court then went on to find an
additional basis for its decision, noting that the statute of 13 Elizabeth, c. 5 (adopted
as part of the common law by New Hampshire) which sought to protect "creditors or
others" from fraudulent conveyances included the widow within the terms "or others."
Walker v. Walker, 66 N.H. 390, 31 Atl. 14 (1890).
23. Stone v. Stone, 18 Mo. 389 (1853).
24. It is interesting to note that in this case, the circumstances were such that a
causa mortis gift analysis would have been very appropriate, the gift in trust being
executed during the last sickness, just a few days prior to the donor's death. On the
trial, it even appeared that the donor had said he was convinced that he had "consump-
tion" and could not live long. Notwithstanding the nature of these facts, the court did
not reason its result in terms of causa mortis gift, but adopted the broader and more
inclusive theory of fraud on the marital rights.
NOTES
not follow if section 301 were interpreted to prohibit only illusory or
colorable transfers which create a result analogous to that prohibited by
the restrictions imposed upon the use of a will in section 301-namely,
those transfers which are absolute in form only. The legislature has not
said, nor implied, that one cannot make an absolute inter vivos disposi-
tion of his personalty; at most, it has implied by the enactment of section
301 that circuitous devices which seek to accomplish an identical result
identical to a testamentary should not be tolerated.2 5
In determining the propriety of the Crawfordsville decision, 6 the
case of Pond v. Sweetser 7 must be compared. In the latter case, the
court stated that a wife, under the then existing law, had no interest in
her husband's personalty prior to his death. The court in the Craw fords-
ville case rejected the contention that the Pond case was a controlling
precedent because the section conferring a power of election was not, at
that time, in existence.2 While this fact provides a valid ground for
distinguishing the two cases, the court could have reinforced its position
by bringing out the factual variations in such a way as to show that the
decisions were not inconsistent. Had the court emphasized that the trust
in the Pond case was created more than a year before the settlor's death,
that it was made without any consideration of impending death, and that
it was absolute in that the settlor was divested of all control and do-
minion, it could have shown that such a trust would have been valid even
though the election statute then existed. Thus the court could have
shown that the trust in the Pond case was precisely the type of inter vivos
conveyance which the law recognized as valid, while the trust involved in
the Crawfordsville case was the type of inter vivos transfer which was
25. Board of Commissioners of the County of Clinton v. Given, 169 Ind. 468, 80
N.E. 965 (1907) ; Sharp v. State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of the County of Kos-
ciusko, 54 Ind. App. 182, 99 N.E. 1072 (1913) ; MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES(2d ed.) p. 133.
26. The Crawfordsville case was decided in 1913; at that time there. were five sec-
tions of the Indiana statutes controlling the interest a wife took when she survived her
husband. Section 3013 abolished dower and curtesy estates. Section 3014 provided
that a wife was to receive one-third of her husband's realty regardless of whether he
died testate or intestate. Section 3025 provided a surviving wife with the power of
election when her husband died testate; a one-third interest in the personal estate was
assured her by this section. Section 3344 provided the minimum a wife was to inherit
under the intestacy section was a one-third part in the personal property of her hus-
band. Section 3349 provided a statutory form of dower to cover lands which the hus-
band may have conveyed but in which the wife had not joined. Thus it seems that the
substantive content of the various sections is the same as the content of the correspond-
ing sections in the present Code. In substance, the present Code represents, at least in
the portion pertinent to this discussion, a mere reorganization and clarification of the
existing law.
27. 85 Ind. 144 (1882).
28. Section 3025 (Burns 1908) was passed in 1891. The Pond case was decided in
1882.
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viewed as illusory and within the exception created by the statutory
change. Moreover, if one is willing to accept that the election power is
but a legislative device to proscribe a result, the soundness of the Craw-
fordsville case cannot be criticized on any grounds except that its reason-
ing was not precise or clear.
The Indiana Reports disclose only a few cases where an inter vivos
transfer of personalty could be described as illusory. Therefore, in order
to further our inquiry, resort is made to the New York cases which have
dealt with such transfers under legislative provisions which are analogous
to those in Indiana. 9 The leading case in this area is Newman v. Dore,"°
a 1937 case which involved the use of a trust to circumvent legislative
provisions analogous to section 301 of the Indiana Probate Code. A
few days prior to the settlor's death, he conveyed all his property to a
trustee. The settlor retained not only the income for life with a power
to revoke the trust, but also the power to direct the trustee in all matters
relating to the trust management. In analyzing the interest which the
statutes gave the surviving spouse, the New York Court of Appeals
concluded that, at most, it was an expectant interest which was capable
of destruction by an inter vivos conveyance of the husband. Postulat-
ing that the right to convey is an inherent part of ownership, the court
concluded that a lawful act which destroys an expectant interest, regard-
less of the motive or intent inspiring the transfer, cannot be viewed as
fraudulent. Therefore, the court reasoned, the only sound test to apply
is "whether the husband has in good faith divested himself of ownership
of his property or [whether he] has made an illusory transfer."'" Note
29. "Election by surviving spouse against or in absence of testamentary pro-
vision.-(1) Where a testator dies after August thirty-first, nineteen hundred and thirty,
and leaves a will thereafter executed and leaves surviving a husband or wife, a personal
right of election is given to the surviving spouse to take his or her share of the estate
as in intestacy, subject to the limitations, conditions, and exceptions contained in this
section." N.Y. DECED. EST. § 18.
"Descent and distribution of estate of decedent.-The real property of a deceased
person, male or female, not devised, shall descend, and the surplus of his or her personal
property, after payment of debts and legacies, and if not bequeathed, shall be distributed
to the surviving spouse, children, or next of kin or other persons, in manner following:
1. One third part to the surviving spouse, and the residue in equal portions to the
children, and such persons as legally represent the children if any of them have died be-
fore the deceased." N.Y. DECED. EST. § 83.
The remaining portions of §§ 18 and 83 of the DECEDENT ESTATE LAW are omitted
for it is felt that their inclusion would add nothing to that already quoted. In § 18, the
deleted portions deal with the manner of election, time, and the extent of the right in
certain situations; in principle the election right is analogous to that in Indiana. In
§ 83, the deleted sub-sections deal with the portions allotted where different combina-
tions of heirs exist.
30. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d (1937).
31. This intent test is decidedly different from the one used by the Missouri court
in Stone v. Stone, 18 Mo. 389 (1853). There the intent was intent in the sense of the
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that the good faith required is not that which refers to the motive or in-
tent inspiring the transfer, but rather to the intent of the transferor to
divest himself of complete ownership in the property which he purports
to convey. Testing the transfer by this standard, the court held the
Newman v. Dore transfer to be illusory-a conveyance in form only.
Therefore, it was ineffective as to the statutory interests secured to the
surviving spouse. The court specifically avoided any line of reasoning
which would label the transfer a testamentary disposition. Rather the
court said:
"We assume, without deciding, that except for the
provisions of section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law the
trust is valid . . .Judged by the substance, not the form,
the testator's conveyance was illusory, intended only as a
mask for the effective retention by the settlor of the prop-
erty which in form he had conveyed."
The fact that the court rested its decision squarely on the provisions
of the Decedent Estate Law after having assumed that the trust was
valid in all other respects is significant in determining the proper effect
to be given to section 509 of the Indiana Probate Code." This section
provides that an inter vivos trust shall not be invalidated for failing to
comply with the requirement of form in section 503 even though the
settlor reserves a power of revocation, alteration, control of investment,
and invasion of principal.3 This section would seem to prevent the
motive which prompted the transfer; whereas here, the intent with which the court is
concerned goes to the good faith in divestment. Thus, under Nemnan v. Dore, motive
is irrelevant, the essential test being whether or not the donor intended to divest himself
of ownership.
32. "Inter vivos trusts-Instrument creating-Execution.-An instrument cre-
ating an inter vivos trust in order to be valid need not be executed as a testamentary in-
strument pursuant to section 503 even though such trust instrument reserves to the
maker or settlor the power to revoke, or the power to alter or amend, or the power to
control investments, or the power to consume the principal, or because it reserves to the
maker or settlor any one or more of said powers." IND. ANN STAT. § 6-509 (Burns
1953).
33. "Execution of Wills-Number of Witnesses required.-The execution of a
will, other than a nuncupative will, must be by the signature of the testator and of at
least two (2) witnesses as follows:
(a) The testator shall signify to the attesting witnesses that the instrument is his
will and either
(1) Himself sign, or
(2) Acknowledge his signature already made, or
(3) At his direction and in his presence have someone else sign his name for
him, and
(4) In any of the above cases the act must be done in the presence of two (2)
or more attesting witnesses.
(b) The attesting witnesses must sign
(1) In the presence of the testator, and
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application of the illusory transfer doctrine in Indiana. 4 However, on
closer analysis such an implication appears unjustified.
Section 509, by its own language, restricts the application of section
503; section 503 regulates property dispositions which are testamentary.
It follows that section 509 is intended to prevent the application of sec-
tion 503 requirements to an inter vivos trust solely on the grounds that
the trust includes one or more of the enumerated powers reserved to the
settlor. Section 509 was enacted for the purpose of eliminating all spec-
ulation as to whether the retention of the enumerated powers by the
settlor would give the transaction a fatal testamentary taint.3" If section
509 is construed in this manner it would still fulfill a useful purpose,
viz., that of preventing the invalidation of a trust solely on the grounds
that certain reserved powers tend to give the trust a testamentary conno-
ation. However, if section 509 is interpreted to abrogate the doctrine of
Newman v. Dore, the policy of section 301 would be frustrated. Such
an interpretation would legalize a means of circumvention-a settlor
could enjoy control until his death. Such a result would not only offend
common sense, but also vitiate the principle of equity that one cannot do
indirectly that which the law forbids him to do directly. This principle
was the heart of the court's reasoning in the case of Newman v. Dore and
one to which the Indiana courts have subscribed on countless occasions.36
There is no reason to believe that the prohibition which is expressed in
section 301 should, or would, be treated in a different manner. There-
fore, though a trust might be validated by section 509 for all other pur-
(2) In the presence of each other."
IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-503 (Burns 1953).
34. In HENRY, PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE c. 30, § 6 (6th ed. 1954), the editor
says: "It would appear that the doctrine of Newman v. Dore has been abrogated by
§ 509 of the Probate Code." This would seem to be a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion for the editor cites § 509 for his authority.
35. In a recent law journal article, Professor Simes said: "Section 6-509 of the
Indiana Code, which has no counterpart in the Model Code, provides that an inter vivos
trust is not rendered testamentary by the reservation in the settlor of a power to amend
or revoke or similar power. Doubtless this is sound common law, but, in view of the
litigation which has arisen on this question, it may be desirable to state the rule in
statutory form." Simes, The Indiana Probate Code and the Model Probate Code: A
Comparison 29 IND. L. 3. 341. This would seem in accord with the views expressed by
the American Law Institute in the comments to the RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 57(2) at
179, where it is said: "The rule stated in Subsection (2) is applicable, however, only
where the settlor reserves such power of control that the transferee is his agent. The
intended trust is not testamentary merely because the settlor reserves power to direct
the trustee as to the making of investments or the exercise of other particular powers,
or power to appoint a substituted trustee."
36. On the rehearing the court in the Crawfordsville case relied upon this precise
proposition: "The conclusion reached in the original opinion is also supported by the
numerous decisions of the Supreme Court and this court which expressly hold that the
courts will not permit one to do indirectly that which the law expressly forbids him from
doing directly." 55 Ind. App. 40, 77, 100 N.E. 1049 (1913).
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poses, it could still be an illusory transfer with respect to the surviving
wife under section 301, because the husband-settlor retained control or
dominion.
Thus far, the analysis has been primarily limited to a consideration
of whether the illusory transfer doctrine is compatible with, if not in-
herent in, the fundamental policies embodied in the Indiana Probate
Code. It is urged that regardless of the analyses adopted by the many
courts, the one thread of consistency which unifies the various doctrines
peculiar to the different jurisdictions-be they reasoned illusory transfer,
colorable transfer," fraud,3" transfer contrary to public policy,39 or causa
mortis gifts-is the unvoiced belief that such transfers are both morally
unfair and in derogation of an obligation which the courts have viewed
with tenderness." The fact that the supporting theories are couched in
different terms in different jurisdictions is explainable to some extent by
noting that the matter is one governed by state statutes which often vary
both in language and in approach.4 Therefore, it is not so much what
37. As in Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W.2d 509 (1940), where the hus-
band deposited all his money in the name of his sister and the sister drew checks at his
order. Also see Blevins v. Pittman, 189 Ga. 789, 7 S.E.2d 662 (1940), where the hus-
band conveyed land to the aunt. The aunt in return gave him the use of the land for
life and devised the land to him by a will in which she prohibited alienation to the wife.
And, as in Stroup v. Stroup, 140 Ind. 179, 39 N.E. 864 (1894), where husband invested
funds in land, title to which was taken in the name of another but colorably, and was
in fact held to the use and benefit of the husband with intent to defeat any claim of the
wife by virtue of her marital relation.
38. Stone v. Stone, 18 Mo. 389 (1853), the facts of which were developed in the
text, supra.
39. In Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 1162, 130 S.W.2d
611 (1939), after stating that the public policy of the state had long been to protect the
widow's share in the property of the husband, said: "We are unwilling to repeal by
implication the statutes of this State and to say that a husband may by means of a
fraudulent conveyance evade the express terms of the statute and that a court of equity
is powerless in the premises." See also Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W.2d 509
(1940).
40. In Staser v. Garr, Scott & Co., 168 Ind. 131, 135, 79 N.E. 404 (1906), it was
said: "The right of a widow to the maintenance out of her deceased husband's estate
is so generally recognized where the common law obtains that it is regarded as one of
the institutions of the state, and, as it rests on moral, equitable and legal rights, it may
be the main-spring of some of the strongest equities. 1 STORY, EQ. JuRIsP. (13th ed.),
§§ 628-30; Crawford v. Hazelrigg (1889), 117 Ind. 63, 2 L.R.A. 139. This tenderness
of the law for the sustenance of the widow has also prompted this court to regard as
benificent, and entitled to a liberal interpretation, legislation which is designed to guard
or even amplify the right of the wife in her husband's real estate." While it is obvious
that the court is here discussing the rights which inure to the benefit of the wife under
§§ 202 and 203, if it can be accepted that § 301 is intended to supplement this right,
because of the transition in the pattern of property ownership outlined above, the re-
marks should be appropriate to guide the interpretation of § 301. This was the con-
tention of the court in the Crawfordsville case.
41. As a court must work with its own state's statute, it is only natural that it
formulate its result in language consistent therewith. Thus, where a statute confers
dower in personalty, or has been so interpreted, the concept of fraud on the marital
rights (which developed under common law dower) is quite naturally adopted as op-
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the courts have said that is important, but rather what they have done.
Section 301 is, therefore, a very significant provision even though
its potentialities are masked in the subtleties of the election device. An
heir is foreclosed from upsetting any inter vivos disposition unless he can
successfully maintain that it does not meet the legal requirements of such
a transfer. The surviving spouse, however, is more than an heir; she is
a forced heir because of section 301. Under the provisions of that sec-
tion she, alone, can challenge the finality of a perfected causa mortis gift
or a valid settlor-controlled trust. In these situations, an heir lacks the
standing to make such a challenge. A creditor, however, can upset such
transfers because of the provisions made for him in section 704.2 Causa
mortis gifts and settlor-controlled trusts are ineffective with respect to
the wife because, as to her-though valid in form-they are invalid in
substance. They are ineffective as to a creditor because they are fraudu-
lent. While only in the causa mortis gift and settlor-controlled trust
situations is the transfer invalid in substance with respect to the wife,
any transfer may be invalid in substance with respect to the creditor.
Therefore, stripping section 301 of its mechanics, it becomes apparent
that the implications of its policy elevate the surviving spouse to a status
which is second only to that of a creditor.
Section 301 expresses a policy which allows the surviving wife to
challenge the validity of any property disposition regardless of whether
the issue of validity is cast in a testate or intestate situation. The sec-
tion's policy is to prohibit the disinheritance of a surviving spouse-a
result not a device. To comprehend the import of this simple admoni-
tion, one must differentiate between the policy which section 301 ex-
presses and the legislative device adopted to fulfill that policy. The limi-
tations of form which attend the election device should not be interpreted
to limit the application of the section's policy. Thus, the determination
by a court that the election power presumes a valid will,"3 would not, un-
posed to some foreign or unfamiliar line of reasoning. In jurisdictions where the court
believes that actual fraud cannot be said to exist, as was the case in NewMna IV. Dare,
the court must work out another rationale when it is felt that the statutory implica-
tions demand such a result, e.g., an illusory transfer. For a collection and comparison
of the various state laws, see, 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, §§ 188 and 189
(1935).
42. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-704 (Burns 1953).
43. "In other words the election statute is predicated upon the existence of a valid
will." Haas v. Haas, 121 Ind. App. 335, 342, 98 N.E.2d 232 (1950). Accord, Murray
v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 15 N.Y.S.2d 915, 919, 258 App. Div. 132 (3rd Dep't 1939).
"Whatever may be the rights which the surviving spouse acquired by Section 18, they ex-
ist only where a decedent 'dies * * * and leaves a will' and then only where written notice
of election is served * * *." Contra, Burns v. Turnbull, 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S.2d
448 (1942), affirmed, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785 (1945).
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der this analysis, imply that the section creates no rights 'unless a valid
will exists. Such remarks do not limit the policy of section 301, they
merely define the mechanics of the election device. To interpret them
otherwise would enable a husband to circumvent the section's policy by
making an illusory, inter vivos disposition in lieu of a will.4" The sub-
stantive interpretation of section 301 cannot be arbitrarily limited; the
substance of the prohibition must be carried to its legitimate conclusion
or its purpose will be frustrated. Thus, the contention that the policy of
section 3011is restricted to testate situations is unsound.45 This is the
44. For instance-suppose that Mr. Smith, an aged widower who has married a
second time, desires to make a disposition of his property which will totally exclude
his present wife. Suppose also, that Mrs. Smith resigned from a career position when
she married Mr. Smith as a result of his assurances that he had sufficient wealth to
provide for both of them so long as they should live. Subsequently, Mr. and Mrs.
Smith have experienced marital difficulties. Mr. Smith now feels that he has made
a mistake in marrying Mrs. Smith, but will be content if he can dispose of his property
to her exclusion. To accomplish this, Mr. Smith conveys all his property (principally
investment securities) to a trustee naming himself income beneficiary for life. After
his death, the trustee is directed to sell the securities and distribute the proceeds equally
among his two children by his former marriage. Since the trust corpus represents
Mr. Smith's entire wealth, he reserves to himself the powers to revoke, amend, invade
the corpus, and direct investments. Mr. Smith, feeling that he has made a complete
disposition of his wealth, makes no will. Subsequently when Mr. Smith dies, Mrs. Smith
learns what her husband has done. Since the powers retained by Mr. Smith are those
allowed by § 509, there is no basis for declaring the trust invalid for failing to comply
with § 503. As Mr. Smith did not execute a will, under the narrower interpretation of
§ 301 which restricts the surviving spouse's rights to situations where a valid will ex-
ists, Mrs. Smith cannot attack the trust on the grounds that it is an illusory transfer.
Thus Mr. Smih has accomplished the very same result which § 301 prohibits, the control
and dominion of his property until the time of death with a subsequent disposition
which excludes his surviving wife. How can such a result be justified if it is conceded
that § 301 prohibits a result, not a mere device for accomplishing that result? There-
fore, § 301 must be viewed as expressing a policy which embraces both testate and in-
testate situations. This is the result which the New York courts have subsequently
reached. The reasons for reversing the earlier interpretation are not stated by the
courts; it is merely stated that a surviving spouse may rely upon the policy of the
election statute in seeking to overturn illusory transfers regardless of whether a valid
will exists. Burns v. Turnbull, 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1943), affirmed, 294
N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785 (1945).
45. In Haas v. Haas, 121 Ind. App. 335, 342, 92 N.E.2d 232 (1950), the court says
almost exactly the same thing as said by the New York court in Murray v. Brooklyn
Say. Bank, supra note 43: "The purpose and effect of § 6-2332, supra, (now § 301 in
the Probate Code) is to make it impossible for a married man, by testamentary disposi-
tion of his property, to deprive his widow of a full one-third thereof. It has no appli-
cation in cases of intestacy and therefore the choice a widow has between the one-third,
of which the law says she cannot be deprived, and what she gets under the terms of a
valid will. In other words the election statute is predicated upon the existence of a
valid will. If a testator makes a will which is of no force and effect the mere failure
of his widow to elect to take under the law cannot be considered as raising a presump-
tion of any kind." Standing alone, these remarks would seem to be a definite limitation
upon the policy which is embodied in § 301. Such a conclusion is, however, not justified
for we cannot view this section as if it were in a vacuum. This section must be cor-
related with the other sections in the Code which govern the devolution of property.
Section 201 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-201 (Burns 1953)), provides for the distribution
of a decedent's estate when he has failed to make a will. Under this section the wife as
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conclusion which has been reached by the New York courts working with
analogous statutory provisions.46
The relationship of benefit to burden which inheres in the owner-
ship of property, is a relationship which is usually recognized and pre-
served. If one receives the benefit of property ownership, he must usu-
ally accept the equal, but opposite, attendant burdens. In this sense, an
illusory transfer by the husband is an attempt to destroy this relation-
ship; it is an attempt to preserve in the owner the control and enjoyment
of property while freeing him of its burdens. Under the interpretation
of section 301 which has been urged above, this result cannot be obtained
insofar as the law requires a decedent to share his property with his sur-
viving spouse. Such a result is not inconsistent with the principles of
free alienation for section 301 does not restrict the power to make an
absolute transfer of property. Conceding that an absolute transfer of
property is beyond the prohibition of that section, the question remains,
to what extent a donor can retain the beneficial incidents and dominion
of the transfered property without subjecting the transfer to subsequent
invalidation on the grounds that it is illusory.
A transfer is illusory on its face when the form in which it is made
leaves the grantor in substantially the same position, in respect to the
property, as that which existed prior to the transfer. Consequently, the
surviving spouse is assured, with certain exceptions, a minimum of a one-third part of
her husband's net estate. Section 301 limits a testator's ability to make a testamentary
property disposition to the exclusion of his wife. Considering these sections together,
it becomes apparent that the Legislature has, by these two sections sought to secure to
the surviving spouse a minimum portion of her husband's estate. In this respect, § 301
is very important for it is by this section that the element of coercion is introduced. It
is the sanction and the catalyst which enables the fulfillment of the policy. It is a means
which is calculated to preserve our concept of free alienation of property (i.e., it would
not restrain alienation in the sense that common law dower would) while at the same
time fulfilling the policy which the Legislature seeks to establish.
We must therefore differentiate between the policy established and the means pro-
vided. As was pointed out earlier, the election prerogative, which obviously presumes a
valid will, is but an expression, a means of fulfilling the policy which seeks to secure
certain rights of inheritance to a surviving spouse. The power of election was adopted
as the method of fulfilling this policy because the will, as a device, offered a means for
accomplishing a result the Legislature now sought to prohibit. Therefore, we cannot
allow a discussion which relates wholly to the means, the power of election, to cloud or
restrict the basic policy of the section.
Similarly, in estimating the content of § 301, one must realize that a will is not the
only means one may utilize in accomplishing the prohibited disinhertance of a spouse.
This realistic fact is incontestably established by the cases which follow an analogous
pattern to that of Nezwnan v. Dore. Thus, considered in this light, the comments made
by the court in Haas v. Haas, which dealt with the requirements of the power of elec-
tion, are not inconsistent with the view that the policy of § 301, as distinguished from
its means, can have an application in intestacy situations.
46. Burns v. Turnbull, 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1943), affirmed 294
N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785; Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 281i1. S.2d
841 (1941), appeal denied 262 App. Div. 966, 30 N.Y.S.2d 399.
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type of interests and powers which a grantor may reserve should be
analyzed first. The decisions make it clear that the retention of a life
interest in the transferred property is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for
rendering a transfer illusory." Even though retention of a life interest
enables a grantor to exercise a significant amount of control over the
transferred property, such a transfer does deprive the grantor of a great
amount of control which he previously enjoyed as absolute owner. Ac-
cordingly, a life tenant may not perpetrate any waste, convert the prop-
erty to cash in order to satisfy his personal neds or obligations, nor do
any act which would injure or impinge upon the remainder interest. Con-
sequently, a transfer with a life interest retained represents an absolute
transfer which does not controvert the policy of section 301. Similarly,
the retention of a power to invade the corpus for the support and main-
tenance of the settlor-beneficiary, when vested in an independent trustee,
is not a power which should invalidate a transfer. Such a transfer is not
illusory, but is absolute in all respects, insofar as the settlor-beneficiary
is concerned. However, where such a power is lodged in the settlor, the
transfer should be viewed as illusory inasmuch as the settlor retains, in
substance, the same powers and privileges previously enjoyed when he
was absolute owner of the transferred property."8 Reservation of the
power to withdraw money and property from the corpus when vested in
a settlor-trustee, where he is the beneficiary of the life interest, would
seem no different than a reservation of a like power in a settlor-
beneficiary where there is an independent trustee. The wife, the real
party in interest, would have no standing to challenge the control of her
husband in the capacity of trustee were it not for section 301.
The effect of retaining a power of revocation is not so clear. Nu-
merous New York cases have stated that a revocable trust is illusory;4"
however, this proposition is rejected by other jurisdictions." The sound-
47. Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941).
48. Not only does the settlor-husband continue to enjoy the same basic powers and
control over the transferred property, but by coupling the trust device with a reserved
power to withdraw the corpus, he has effectively placed the property beyond the reach
of the wife's expectancy while preserving the right to make piecemeal withdrawals of
corpus without dstroying the trust's efficacy. This fact is crucial inasmuch as it is this
result which makes the transfer illusory-the husband can regulate his withdrawals so
that they are immediately consumed leaving nothing to which the wife's claim can
attach.
49. Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1941);
In re Cohen's Will, 90 N.Y.S.2d 776, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949); Murray v. Brooklyn Sav-
ings Bank, 258 App. Div. 132, 15 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1939) ; Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27,
32 N.E.2d 779 (1941).
50. Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945) ; Leahy v. Old Col-
ony Trst Co., 326 Mass. 43, 91 N.E.2d 920 (1950) ; Ascher v. Cohen, 333 Mass. 397, 131.
N.E..1 198 (1956).
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ness of the generalization in these New York cases seems somewhat
questionable. In each of these cases, the settlor retained other powers
which were sufficient to render the transfer illusory without considering
the power of revocation.5 Furthermore, the retention of the power to
revoke does not create any power in the settlor to treat the property as his
own; rather, until he revokes, the settlor is as a stranger to the trans-
ferred property." Thus, while the power remains unexercised, the settlor
as well as his wife are foreclosed from asserting any claims in the trans-
ferred property. Should the power be exercised, the property becomes
vested in the settlor and it is once again subject to the claims of the wife
provided she survive her husband. Consequently, it is erroneous to con-
tend that this power renders a transfer illusory, for while the power
remains unexercised the transfer is absolute and when it is exercised
there is no need to invoke the illusory transfer doctrine.
A transfer which is not illusory on its face may be shown to be il-
lusory by the facts and circumstances which attend the transfer. This
proposition finds support in the cases which have considered the validity
of non-trust transfers. In these situations, the courts have looked to the
extrinsic facts which accompany and follow the transfer to determine
whether the form of the transfer is a true reflection of its substance.53
51. In Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1941),
the decedent placed the major portion of his wealth in trust while retaining the powers
to revoke, alter or amend in part or total, and to withdraw any portion of the trust
corpus. The court concentrated on the power to revoke making no mention of the
power to withdraw corpus. As indicated in footnote 48 supra, the power to withdraw
corpus is in itself sufficient grounds for invalidating a transfer. Furthermore, this
power is more significant when considering the illusory nature of a transfer inasmuch
as the exercise of the power does not terminate the trust; conversely, the exercise of a
power to revoke terminates a trust bringing the husband-settlor's property within the
reach of the wife's claim should she be the surviving spouse. In Krause v. Krause, 285
N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941), the decedent created a Totten Trust; the court invali-
dated the transfer with respect to the wife's claim on the grounds that it was a re-
vocable trust-the settlor having retained possession of the passbook. Retention of the
passbook can, however, be criticized in terms of an unrestricted power to withdraw
corpus as well as a power to revoke. In substance, the objection to such a transfer is
the ability of the settlor to unrestrictedly convert the transferred property to his own
needs while foreclosing the claims of his wife. The court in In re Cohen.s Will con-
cluded that a revocable trust was illusory. In support of this, the court relied on the
Schnakenberg case without noting that additional powers were retained which rendered
the transfer illusory.
52. Furthermore, to say that a revocable trust is illusory is to reject the funda-
mental principle that a vested interest can be conveyed on a condition subsequent. This,
in itself, is contrary to the New York cases which indicate that a vested remainder sub-
ject to a general power of appointment is not illusory. City Bank Farmer's Trust v.
Miller, 278 N.Y. 134, 15 N.E.2d 553 (1938) ; In re Burchell's Trust, 278 App. Div. 450,
105 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1951).
53. In Thomas v. Louis, 284 App. Div. 784, 135 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1954), the husband
successfully overturned an inter vivos transfer made by his wife. In 1939, the estranged
wife gratuitously conveyed by warranty deed to her sister, the title to her residence.
Subsequently, the husband and wife were re-united and lived in the residence until the
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Thus, where the donor and donee conduct their affairs in a manner in-
consistent with a transfer of ownership, the courts have uniformly held
the transfers to be illusory." On the other hand, where the donor and
donee have conducted their affairs in a manner consistent with a change
of ownership, a challenge that the transfer is illusory has been consistently
rejected.55 Accordingly, it has been argued that where decedent has
wife's death. Shortly after the wife's death, the sister recorded the 1939 deed. In sus-
taining the husband's claim that the conveyance was illusory, the court relied upon the
fact that the husband and wife had lived in the residence for eleven years after the
conveyance without paying rent, made substantial improvements to the property, made
the mortgage payments, carried insurance on the property in the wife's name, paid the
property taxes, and exercised complete dominion and control over the property. The
importance of the parties' conduct following the transaction was emphasized when the
court distinguished the present conveyance from a conveyance in the Krause case where
a life estate had been reserved but the deed had been recorded. The Krause transfer
was characterized as being open and above board, whereas the instant transfer was
permeated with secret limitations and agreements.
54. In re Sanchez Estate 58 N.Y.S.2d 230 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945), offers a typical
example. The decedent-husband and his brother had incorporated their partnership.
The capital stock (100 shares) was issued: twenty-five shares to the decedent, twenty-
five shares to the brother, twenty-five shares to the brother's wife, and twenty-five
shares to a third party. Subsequently, through numerous gratuitous transfers at the de-
cedent's instances, the capital stock became the property of the decedent and the third
party. During this time, the decedent and his wife were legally separated though not
divorced. After the husband's death, the wife elected to take under the law and claimed
a one-third interest in all the stock. The court sustained the widow's claim holding the
transfers to be illusory inasmuch as the husband-after the transfers-continued to ex-
ercise the voting rights of the transferred stock, executed waivers as sole owner to
dispense with shareholder meetings, and continued to conduct the business as sole owner.
The third party, in resisting the wife's contention, asserted that the transfers were
inter vivos gifts; the court rejected this assertion pointing out that the pseudo-owner
never attended shareholder meetings nor did any acts consistent with a fifty percent
ownership of the corporation. While the court did not comment on the relationship be-
tween the husband and the woman (the third party) claiming the stock under his gifts,
it would seem that the relationship was such as to support the court's conclusion that
the transfer was a mere sham. In a similar case, Marano v. LaCarro, 62 N.Y.S.2d 121
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946), the husband was sole owner of a corporation. He transferred his
capital stock to a corporate trustee in exchange for its promise to support and care for
him. Following the transfer, the husband continued to reside on company property,
manage and control the corporation as its only active officer, collect all monies due the
corporation, mingle his funds with corporate funds, pay his debts with corporate funds,
and keep all documents of title, leases, and insurance in his own name. The court sus-
tained the widow's contention that the transfer was illusory even though it appeared
valid on its face. In rejecting the trustee's contention of ownership, the court pointed
out that it (the trustee) had not paricipated in any shareholder meetings as a sole owner
would undoubtedly do, nor done anything in fulfillment of its promise to support the
decedent.
55. In In re Wrone's Estate, 177 Misc. 541, 31 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1941), the husband
was sole owner of a corporation. During his life he transferred fifty shares of capital
stock to a third party who made subsequent dispositions of the stock pursuant to the
husband's direction. The husband continued to manage the corporation as before, but
in respect to the transferred stock, the record was void of any evidence from which it
could be inferred that the transfer was not absolute and complete. The court, rejecting
the widow's claim that the transfer was illusory, characterized the transfer as a com-
pleted inter vivos gift. Similarly, in In re Galewitz Estate, 206 Misc. 218, 132 N.Y.S.2d
297 (1954), the court rejected the widow's claim that a "buy and sell" contract executed
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made deposits of his money in a joint savings account, he has, in sub-
stance, made an illusory conveyance of his property, since he has retained
absolute control during his lifetime. Nevertheless, the New York courts
have refused to apply the illusory transfer doctrine to this type of trans-
action, holding that the situation is controlled by the New York Banking
Law. 6  The courts of Massachusetts have reached a similar result
through a common law analysis-the rationale being that a present in-
terest has been created and conveyed. 7 While this result can be justified
by distinguishing between a conditional gift and an absolute gift of a con-
ditional interest, such a distinction fails to satisfy the policy inherent
in section 301. When a joint bank account is created, the donor retains
the unrestricted right and power to withdraw any amount for his per-
sonal use. While in theory, he may have created an interest in his joint
tenant, he has surrendered no real control. Furthermore, in these situa-
tions, the donor usually retains the passbook and the donee is not aware
that the joint tenancy has been created. Certainly this is a transfer
which violates the policy of section 301. Inasmuch as Indiana does not
have a statute which requires the result reached in New York and Mas-
sachusetts, it would seem that joint bank accounts should be viewed as
illusory when employed to circumvent the policy of section 301." United
States Savings Bonds are, however, beyond the scope of the illusory
transfer doctrine even though the purchaser has complete control of such
bonds throughout his life. This result was first reached by the courts
of New York;5" subsequently, the legislature codified the rule. Indiana,
between the father and son was illusory under the Decedent Estate Law. In sustaining
the validity of the contract, the court said that this was a contract creating present rights
enforceable in the future. Inasmuch as the contract required a purchase price to be paid
to the estate of the seller, there was no significant diminution of the estate. Here there
was no attempt to reduce the amount available to the widow, but rather an intent to
continue the ownership and management of the corporation within the present group of
owners-the father and son.
56. The court in Inda v. Inda, 32 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941), conceded
that joint bank accounts violated the policy of the Decedent Estate Law, but regardless
of this, the court felt compelled to follow the mandate of the New York Banking Law
which created a conclusive presumption vesting title in the donee-depositor. However,
the court distinguished between a joint savings account and a joint commercial account
on the grounds that the latter was not governed by the section creating the statutory
presumption; therefore, the joint commercial bank account was invalidated on the
grounds that it was illusory.
57. Malone v. Walsh, 315 Mass. 484, 53 N.E.2d 126 (1944).
58. But see Hibbard v. Hibbard, 118 Ind. App. 292, 73 N.E.2d 181 (1948), where
the execution of the registration card for a joint bank account followed by subsequent
deposits was said to create gifts in praesenti of a joint interest with rights of survivor-
ship. In this case the validity of the account was challenged by the legal representative
of the donor; consequently, the case is not binding authority where the surviving spouse
is making the challenge inasmuch as the policy of § 301 inures only to a surviving
spouse.
59. Hart v. Hart, 194 Misc. 162, 81 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1948).
NOTES
like New York, has a statute which forecloses the application of the illu-
sory transfer doctrine in this situation."° This position is completely de-
fensible even though it may seem inconsistent with the illusory transfer
doctrine, inasmuch as state policy and law must yield where conflict re-
sults in an area subject to exclusive federal regulation.
Thus, the amount of control retained by the donor, demonstrated
either by actual control or by express reservation of the power to control,
would seem to be the crucial consideration from which the genuineness
of the transfer is inferred. In this evidentiary capacity, control or the
power to control furnishes the means by which the court pierces the form
of the transaction. Control or the power to control is the ingredient
which gives content and meaning to the principle of Newman v. Dore-
the principle that a transfer, in order to foreclose the claims of a surviv-
ing spouse, must be made with a "good faith" intent to divest the trans-
ferror of the property he purports to convey. Since this test is, in a
sense, subjective-though it is applied to objective crtieria-the degree
of predictability in many situations is rather limited. After having made
a rather extensive review of the New York authorities, one court com-
mented, "In its subsequent decisions the Court of Appeals has continued
to judge the validity of the transfer upon the facts in each case."' How-
ever, as indicated above, there are certain types of powers and transfers
which can be categorized because of their special characteristics. Beyond
this point, however, further specificity is difficult because of the empha-
sis placed upon the facts attending each individual transaction. There-
fore, while the precedents can serve as helpful guides, they cannot be
viewed as conclusive. The ultimate determination of whether a transfer
is illusory turns upon the factual circumstances which surround the in-
dividual transfer.
ALLOCATING TENANT TORT LIABILITY THROUGH THE
FIRE INSURANCE POLICY
If real property is destroyed by fire, the holder of the fee must
normally bear the loss to the premises, unless there is another party upon
whom the loss may be shifted. If the fire which destroys the premises
has been caused by a negligent third party, well established principles of
60. IND. AN. STAT. § 5-104 (Burns 1953).
61. In re Kalina's Will, 184 Misc. 367, 53 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1945).
